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The Delhi Sands Flower-Loving
Fly ("Fly") is a rare creature.
Belonging to the "mydas flies"
family, it is one of the few fly species
that visit flowers in search of nectar,
thereby pollinating native plants.
The Fly lives only in the "Delhi
series" of soils found in southwest-
ern San Bernardino County and
northwestern Riverside County
California.- The Fly is the only
remaining subspecies of its species,
the others driven to extinction by
habitat destruction.
Threatened by unauthorized trash
dumping, urban development, and
off-road vehicle use, the Delhi
Sands Flower-Loving Fly is also in
danger of extinction.' Currently,
only eleven known populations of
the Fly exist, all within an eight-mile
radius.' "The size of the entire
population. .. fils estimated in the
low hundreds."' Ninety-seven
percent of their habitat has been
destroyed.'
The Fly was placed on the
endangered species list in I993.9 As
an endangered species, the Fly was
protected under §9(a)(1) of the
Endangered Species Act ("ESA")
from commercial trade and could not
be "taken" without a permit or an
exemption from the Fish and Wildlife
Service ("FWS").'o Environmental-
ists and others interested in the Fly's
survival believed that this action
would help protect the Fly and its
habitat. However, the proposed
building of a county hospital and a
Commerce Clause challenge to the
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9 58 Fed.Reg. 49,881 (1993) (codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17). The Fish and Wildlife Service found the Fly was "in imminent
danger of extinction due to extensive habitat loss and degradation that has reduced its range by 97 percent."
0 Section 9(a)(1) ofthe ESA. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B), makes it unlawful for an individual to "take" any endangered species.
To"take" isdefined under 16 U.S.C. §1532(19) as"to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, orcollect,
or attempt to engage in any such conduct."





application of the ESA "take"
provision soon threatened the life of
the Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
The National Association of
Home Builders of the United States,
the Building Industry Legal Defense
Fund, the California Building Indus-
try Association, the County of San
Bernardino, the City of Fontana, and
the City of Colton, California
("plaintiffs") challenged the applica-
tion of §9(a)(1) of the ESA to the
Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly."
The plaintiffs argued that the
application was not within the
authorized power delegated to
Congress in the Commerce Clause
and was, therefore, . unconstitu-
tional.12 The plaintiffs sought an
injunction against the application of
§9 of the ESA to the construction of
the San Bernardino Hospital.' 3
The County of San Bernardino
("County") planned to build a 470
million-dollar earthquake-proof hos-
pital to serve as a teaching facility
and a central emergency medical
center in case of an earthquake.14 In
July 1992, the hospital board
acquired a seventy-six acre site on
which to construct this state-of-the-
art hospital."5 This parcel of land,
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however, included part of the Fly's
last remaining habitat.'6 The hospital
board discovered in November 1992
that the Fly was likely to be listed as
endangered, and in May 1993, the
board learned from the FWS that the
Fly was classified as endangered."
The FWS advised the board that the
construction of the proposed hospi-
tal would constitute a "taking" ofthe
species under §9 of the ESA.' 8 As
a result, the board modified its plans
by moving the hospital two hundred-
fifty feet north, providing an eight
acre habitat preserve for the Fly.' 9
The plan also created a hundred-
foot wide corridor to permit
interbreeding between Fly colo-
nies. 2 0
In October 1994, the County
desired to build a substation to power
the hospital on four acres of land
which were considered the best
remaining habitat for the Fly.2' They
consulted with the FWS about
applying for an incidental "taking" of
the Fly under § 10 of the ESA. 22 The
FWS issued such a permit after the
County proposed to set off and
manage a nearby 7.5 acres for the
Fly.23 In November 1995, the
County told the FWS of its plan to
reduce the one hundred-foot-wide
corridor to eighteen feet in order to
redesign an intersection to provide
for emergency vehicle access.2 4
The FWS informed the County that
this seventy to eighty percent
reduction of the corridor, which was
crucial for interbreeding between
Fly colonies, would probably result
in a "taking" of the Fly.25
After negotiations between the
FWS and the County failed, the
plaintiffs filed suit in the District
Court for the District of Columbia
against Bruce Babbitt, the Secre-
tary of the Department of the
Interior, and Mollie Beattie, the
Director of the FWS. 26  The
plaintiffs challenged the application
of §9 of the ESA to the Fly and
argued that the federal government
had no constitutional authority to
regulate the use of private land to
protect an insect located only in a
single state, California.21 The
government moved for summary
judgment on the grounds that the
application of §9 did not exceed
Congress' Commerce Clause power
and was a constitutionally permis-
sible exercise of authority.' The
Court entered summary judgment
for the government.29
The plaintiffs appealed to the
United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia.3 0 After
reviewing the plaintiffs' claim, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the
District Court's ruling.' The Court
concluded that §9 of the ESA was
applicable to the Fly, an endangered
species, and any "taking" of the Fly
would be in violation of the ESA.12
The Court found that the ESA's
application to the Fly was within the
powers granted to Congress by the
Commerce Clause, as it involved
regulating the use of channels of
interstate commerce. 3 Further, the
Court concluded that application
substantially affected interstate com-
merce by preventing destruction of
biodiversity and destructive inter-
state competition.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 1043.




22 Id. at 1045. Section 10 of the ESA authorizes the Secretary of the FWS to permit a taking of a species if the taking isincidental to performing a lawful activity. The party must submit a conservation plan, and public comment may be heard onthe plan. The Secretary must find that the take will not appreciably reduce the likelihood of survival of the species. See 16U.S.C. § 1539(a).




2 Id. at 1043.
" Id at 1045. Summaryjudgment is appropriate when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact." See Fed.R.Civ.P.56.
9 NationalAss n ofHome Builders, 130 F.3d at 1045.
30 Id.
31 Id.






The United States Constitution, in
Article I, Section 8, grants Congress
the power to "regulate commerce
with foreign nations, and among the
several states, and with Indian
tribes."" Since the Constitution's
inception, courts have struggled to
interpret the term "commerce."36
What constitutes interstate com-
merce? What activities, even
though carried on in a single state,
substantially affect interstate com-
merce? These are the questions
courts try to answer when faced
with a challenge to a congressional
exercise of power under the
Commerce Clause.
"The Commerce Clause is one of
the most prolific sources of national
power." 37 Under the Commerce
Clause, Congress has broad regula-
tory authority." Congress can
regulate those activities between
two or more states and those within
one state that substantially affect
interstate commerce." Judicial
review of an act under the
Commerce Clause must be highly
deferential to Congress; the court
must ask whether there was any
reasonable rationale for Congress'
conclusion that the activity substan-
tially affected interstate com-
merce.
40
From the early 1800s until the
early 1900s, courts rarely examined
congressional power under the
Commerce Clause.4 ' Instead, the
courts focused on the Commerce
Clause as a "limit on state legislation
that discriminated against interstate
comnerce." 42  Through their re-
view, the courts began to categorize
certain types of activity as constitut-
ing purely intrastate commerce.13
Such activities, which were beyond
the reach of Congress under the
Commerce Clause, included pro-
duction, mining, and manufactur-
ing.44
The next great era in Commerce
Clause jurisprudence resulted from
the Interstate Commerce Act of
1887.45 In several cases, such as
A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v.
United States,46 the Supreme Court
held that activities directly affecting
interstate commerce were within
Congress' power, but those indi-
rectly affecting interstate com-
merce were not. In Schecter, the
Supreme Court abolished a federal
government regulation that fixed the
hours and wages of eniployees in an
intrastate business because it was
only indirectly related to interstate
commerce.48  The Court struck
down the regulation due to its
concern that "there would be
virtually no limit to the federal
government for all practical pur-
U.S. CONST., art. I, §8, cl. 3.
6 See Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 189-90 (1824), in which Justice Marshall first defined commerce. "Commerce,
undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is something more: it is intercourse. It describes the commercial intercourse between nations,
and parts of nations, in all its branches, and is regulated by prescribing rules for carrying on that intercourse."
" H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525,534 (1949).
3 Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 326 (1979). See United Statesv. Helsley, 615 F.2d 784, 787 (9th Cir. 1979), which stated,
"[t]he power to regulate commerce is plenary and once the power exists it is for Congress, not the courts, to choose the ends
for which its exercise is appropriate."
" Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314,323 (1981).
40 Id.
41 United Statesv. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,553 (1995).
42 Id.
43 Id. at 554. See Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1 (1888) (upholding a state prohibition on manufacturing alcohol because it
constituted domestic commerce between "man and man within a State.").
44 See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. I11, 121 (1942) (tracing the development of Commerce Clause jurisprudence); United
States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 12 (1895) ("Commerce succeeds to manufacture, and not part of it."). In E. C. Knight, the
federal government sued under the Sherman Antitrust Act to force a major sugar refiner to divest itself of other recently
acquired refiners. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. at 12. The Court held that Congress could not under the Commerce Clause forbid
a monopoly in "manufacture." Id. The refinery was a manufacturing operation regardless of whether or not sugar was ever
sold in interstate commerce. Id.
4 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 554.
46 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
41 Id. At issue in Schecter, was the validity of the National Industrial Labor Recovery Act (NIRA), which allowed the
President to adopt codes of fair competition for trades and industries, such as minimum wage and maximum hour
requirements. Id. In Schecter, Schecter Poultry Corporation was convicted of violating the wage and hour provisions of the
New York Metropolitan Area Live Poultry Industry Fair Competition Code. Id. Schecter Poultry Corporation bought poultry
within New York City and resold it exclusively to local dealers. Id. The U.S. Supreme Court found the wage policies of an
intrastate enterprise were too indirect to allow for congressional control, even if such policies did force interstate competitors
to lower prices. Id. The NIRA was held unconstitutional. Id.
4 Id.
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poses we should have a completely
centralized government." 49
The defining terms of direct and
indirect interstate commerce imple-
mented by the Court in Schecter fell
into disregard after the landmark
case of NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp. This case viewed
congressional authority under the
Commerce Clause in terms of
degree.5' The Supreme Court found
that Congress could regulate those
activities which had such "a close
and substantial relation to interstate
commerce that their control [was]
essential or appropriate to protect
that commerce from burdens and
obstructions."" Under Jones &
Laughlin, so long as the regulated
activity had a substantial economic
effect upon interstate commerce, it
was irrelevant whether that activity
occurred before, during, or after
interstate movement.53
Along with Jones & Laughlin,
United States v. Darby54 and
Wickard v. Filburn" expanded the
boundaries of Congress' Com-
merce Clause power well beyond
that of the early years of the
Constitution. 6 These Supreme
Court cases emphasized the idea
that the meaning of the phrase
"substantial relation to interstate
commerce" was not to be narrowly
defined."
Darby involved the manufac-
ture of lumber by Georgia employ-
ees who worked for less than the
prescribed minimum wage and
beyond the maximum hours set by
law without overtime pay. 8 The
federal government restricted the
company's shipment of lumber into
interstate commerce, as a penalty
for violation of the Fair Labor
Standards Act.59  The Supreme
Court upheld the Act as it applied to
the company." The Court stated
that Congress' authority over
interstate commerce "extends to
those activities intrastate which so
affect interstate commerce or the
exercise of the power of Congress
over it as to make regulation of them
appropriate means to the attainment
of a legitimate end."6' The
legitimate end in Darby was the
prevention of substandard labor
conditions and suppression of unfair
competition.62
In Wickard, the Supreme Court
upheld the amendments to the
Agricultural Adjustment Act of
1938 and their application to wheat
consumption.63  The Agricultural
Adjustment Act permitted the
Secretary of Agriculture to set
quotas on wheat growth for every
farm in the country, regardless of.
whether the wheat was intended for
interstate or intrastate sale."4 Ex-
" Id. at 548. See also Carter v. Carter Coal, 298 U.S. 238 (1936), where the Supreme Court held that the Bituminous CoalConservation Act of 1935, which set maximum hours and minimum wages for coal mine workers, was unconstitutional. Id.The Court viewed production as different from commerce. d. Production did not directly affect interstate commerce, even ifthe coal would all be eventually sold into the market. Id.
so 301 U.S. 1 (1937). Jones & Laughlin involved the constitutionality of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (NLRA).Id. The NLRB was attempting to prevent Jones & Laughlin from engaging in unfair labor practices by discriminatorily firingemployees involved in union activity. Id. The NLRA as it applied to Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. was upheld by a majority
of the Court as a valid exercise of Congress' Commerce Clause power. Id. Although Jones & Laughlin manufactured steelonly in Pennsylvania, the company had mines in two other states, warehouses in four states, operated steamships on theGreat Lakes, and sent seventy-five percent of its product out of state. Id. The Court found a labor stoppage of intrastate
manufacturing operations in Pennsylvania would have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. Id.
* Id at 36. Beginning with this case, the Supreme Court began to show a much greater willingness to defer to legislativedecisions. Only in one case since 1937 has the Court found that Congress exceeded its Commerce Clause power. See infra
note 83 and accompanying text.
" Jones& Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 37.
5 Id.
54 312 U.S. 100 (194 1).
" 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
* See Darby, 312 U.S. 100; W1ickard, 317 U.S. 111.
" Lopez, 514 U.S. at 555.
5 8Darby,312U.S.at I11.
5 Id.
6 Id. at 126. The Court held that the Act was definite enough to meet constitutional demands. Id. "One who employspersons, without conforming to the prescribed wage and hour conditions, to work on goods which he ships or expects to ship
across state lines, is warned that he may be subject to the criminal penalties of the Act. No more is required." Id.6! Id. at 118.
62 Id.
63 Wickard, 317 U.S.at 128-29.
6 Id. at 115.
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cess wheat raised was subject to a
per-bushel penalty.65 Filburn owned
a small farm and raised wheat solely
for consumption on his farm." He
challenged the Act as it applied to
him, arguing that his was a purely
local activity and beyond the scope
of federal control.6' The Court
reviewed the demand for wheat in
terms of whether the activity,
regardless of its nature, exerted a
substantial economic effect on
interstate commerce." In upholding
a federal economic act, Wickard is
arguably the Court's most far-
reaching decision into intrastate
activity.69
The expansion of Congress'
power came at a time of great
industrial change in the United
States. Businesses were becoming
increasingly more national in char-
acter and technological advances in
transportation and communication
were aiding this expansion. 0 The
Supreme Court's decisions allowed
Congress to exert more influence
over such enterprises, even though
they sometimes appeared com-
pletely intrastate in nature." One
such business was the Heart of
Atlanta Motel in Georgia, a 216-
room motel that followed a practice
of refusing to rent rooms to blacks."
The operators of the motel attacked
the constitutionality of the public
rights accommodations provision of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, arguing
that Congress exceeded its Com-
merce Clause power in applying the
Act to their intrastate hotel." The
operators contended that they were
deprived of their right to choose
customers and operate a business as
they wished." The Supreme Court
in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.
United States"s upheld the applica-
tion as a valid exercise of Congress'
Commerce Clause power.7 6  The
Court found that denying access to
rooms interfered significantly with
interstate commerce, and the
company had actively solicited out-
of-state customers through bill-
boards and other forms of advertis-
ing."
The Commerce Clause, however,
has boundaries. " From the 1940s to
the present, the Supreme Court has
warned Congress to keep its
authority within rational bounds."
In Maryland v. Wirtz,"8 the Court
stated, "the power to regulate
commerce, though broad indeed,
has limits that the Court has ample
power to enforce."'" A court must
be deferential to Congress' author-
ity under the Commerce Clause but
may look to see whether the
regulation affects activities that are
too remote and insubstantial to be
considered part of interstate com-
merce.
8 2
One of the most recent examina-
tions of the limits on the exercise of
63 Id. at 114-15.
" Id. at 114.
61 Id. at 113-14.
6 Id. at 127-28. Filburn's own contribution may have been trivial but that was not "enough to remove him from the scope of
federal regulation where, as here, his contribution, taken together twith that of many others similarly situated is far from
trivial." Id.
69 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560.
70 Id. at 556.
7' Id.
7 Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 243 (1964).
7 Id. at 243-44.
7 Id.
7 379U.S. 241 (1964).
16 Id. at 262.
7 Id. at 261-62. The Court noted that seventy-five percent of the motel customers were from out of state. Id. The Court stated
that other methods to eliminate the obstructions found in interstate commerce due to racial discrimination could have been
pursued by Congress. Id. However, this is a matter of policy that left up to Congress and not the Court. "How obstructions
are to be removed--what means are to be employed--is within the sound and exclusive discretion of Congress. It is subject
only to one caveat--that the means chosen by it.must be reasonably adapted to the end permitted by the Constitution." Id.
78 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 556.
7 Id. at 557. See Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 37 (Interstate commerce "must be considered in light of our dual system of
government and may not be extended so as to embrace effects upon interstate commerce so indirect and remote..." Id.).;
Heart ofAtlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 261-262.
8 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
* Id. at 196.
* Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining& Reclamation Ass'n., Inc., 452 U.S. 264,280 (1981).
8 514 U.S. 549 (1995). Note, Lopez was the only case since 1937 to strike down an application of a congressional act under
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congressional power under the
Commerce Clause was the land-
mark case of United States v.
Lopez.8 3
In Lopez, the defendant, a twelfth
grade student, carried a gun to
school and was convicted of
possessing a firearm in a school zone
in violation of the Gun-Free School
Zones Act of 1990.84 The Court
struck down the Act, upon finding
that the possession of a firearm in a
school zone did not substantially
affect interstate commerce.ss The
Court noted that in striking down the
statute, it was declining to further
extend Congress' Commerce Clause
power.8 6
To limit such power, the Court in
Lopez enunciated three categories
of activity which Congress was
permitted - to regulate under the
Commerce Clause." First, Con-
gress may regulate the use of
channels of interstate commerce. 8
Second, Congress has the power to
regulate and protect instrumentali-
ties of interstate commerce, or
persons and things in interstate
commerce, even if the threat comes
from intrastate activities.89 Third,
Congress can regulate those activi-
ties having a substantial relation to
interstate commerce.' In explain-
ing the third category, the Court
stated, "[w]here economic activity
substantially affects interstate com-
merce, legislation regulating that
activity should be judicially sus-
tained," even if the activity may be
purely local.9'
Under this third category of
substantial relation, the Court of-
fered three areas of inquiry. 2 First,
does the regulation control a
commercial activity, or an activity
necessary to the regulation of some
commercial activity?93  Second,
does the statute include "a jurisdic-
tional nexus requirement to ensure
that each regulated instance of the
activity affects interstate com-
merce?"9 Third, does the rationale
offered to support the constitutional-
ity of the statute have a logical
stopping point, as to not be so broad
as to regulate all types of human
activity?95
In National Ass'n of Home
Builders, the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia
used the three categories set out in
Lopez to determine whether the
ESA "take"provision, as it applied to
the Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly,
was a constitutional exercise of
congressional power under the
Commerce Clause."
IV. INSTANT DECISION
A. The Court's Opinion
In National Ass'n of Home
Builders, the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia
upheld the application of §9(a)(1) of
the ESA to the Delhi Sands Flower-
Loving Fly.97 The Court held that the
prohibition against "taking" the
endangered species was within
Congress' power under the Com-
merce Clause to regulate the use of
channels of interstate commerce,
and the regulation substantially
affected interstate commerce, as it
8 514 U.S. 549 (1995). Note, Lopez was the only case since 1937 to strike down an application of a congressional act underthe theory that it was an unconstitutional exercise of Commerce Clause power.
' Lopez, 514 U.S. at 549. The Gun-Free School Zones Act forbids "any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a placethat [he] knows. . .is a school zone." 18 U.S.C. §922(q)(1)(A).
8 Lopez, 514 U.S.at631.
* Id. The Court did not alter its pre-Lopez decisions concerning the Commerce Clause. Justice Kennedy stated, "[tihe legal
system as a whole ha[s] an immense stake in the stability of our Commerce Clause jurisprudence as it has evolved to thispoint." Id. at 569.
SId. at 558. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964)(quoting Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470,491 (1917), "[tihe authority of Congress to keep the channels of interstate
commerce free from immoral and injurious uses has been frequently sustained, and is no longer open to question.").Lopez, 514 U.S. at558. See Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 342 (1914); Southern R. Co. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20 (1911).Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558. See NLRBv. Jones& Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558.
91 Id. at 560.
2 Id. at 559-65. See United States v. Wall, 92 F.3d 1444, 1455-56 (6th Cir. 1996); National Ass'n ofHome Builders, 130 F.3dat 1064 (Dissenting opinion lists the three categories of commerce Congress can regulate).
" Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-65.
9 NationalAss'n ofHome Builders, 130 F.3d at 1064.
95 Id.
9 Id. at 1045.
97 Id.
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prevented the destruction of
biodiversity and the destruction of
interstate competition.9"
The plaintiffs argued that the
federal government had no authority
to regulate the use of non-federal
lands in order to protect a species
which is only located in one state.99
They contended that the Constitu-
tion of the United States gave the
federal government no grant of
power to regulate wildlife on non-
federal lands.'"0
The plaintiffs relied heavily on
United States v. Lopez for the
proposition that the government's
application ofthe ESA to the Fly was
unconstitutional.o'0 The Court used
Lopez as the starting point for its
examination of the relationship
between the ESA and the Com-
merce Clause. 02  Whether the
ESA's regulation of the Fly was
within Congress' authority to regu-
late the "use of channels of
interstate commerce" and/or within
"those activities that substantially
affect interstate commerce" were
the two questions the Court
attempted to resolve by referring to
Lopez. 0 3
The Court found that Congress
was authorized under the Com-
merce Clause to apply §9(a)(1) of
the ESA to the Fly, as it was a proper
exercise over the channels of
interstate commerce.'" The Court
noted that while the term "use of
channels of interstate commerce"
was usually thought to refer only to
the transportation of persons or
goods, it should not be so narrowly
defined. 0  Instead, the term
provided a justification for the
application of §9(a)(1) to the Fly.'"
The Court found that the ban
against "taking" endangered species
allowed the government to control
the transport of endangered species
in interstate commerce, as well as,
"keep the channels of interstate
commerce from immoral and injuri-
ous uses."o'0 The application of
§9(a)(1) to the Fly performed such
functions by allowing Congress to
use its authority to help save an
endangered species, which was
threatened by the construction of a
hospital.1" The construction pre-




01 Id. See Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
'" NationalAss'n ofHome Builders, 130 F.3d at 1046.
103 Id. at 1045. See supra notes 87-95 and accompanying text.
'" NationalAss'n offHome Builders, 130 F.3d at 1046.
105 Id.
106 Id.
1o7 Id. (quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc.v. United States, 379 U.S. 241,256(1964)).
'" Id. at 1048.
' " Id.
110 Id.
' Id. at 1049.
"1 Id. The Court quoted Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942), which stated that "even if appellee's activity be local
and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a
substantial economic effect on interstate commerce." Id. It also cited its recent decision in Terryv. Reno, 101 F.3d 1412 (D.C.
Cir. 1996), upholding the Freedom of Access to Clinics Entrances Act as a valid exercise of congressional power under the
Commerce Clause, despite the noncommercial nature of the activity, i.e., interfering with clinic access. Id.
' Id. at 1050.
114 Id. at 1051.
"I Id. The Lopez Court found no "congressional findings [that] would enable [it] to evaluate the legislative judgment that
the activity in question substantially affected interstate commerce. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563.
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and people from outside the state." 9
Such a facility would also likely
attract employees, patients, and
students from outside the state. 0
The Court next reasoned that the
"take" provision ofthe ESA could be
seen as a constitutionally permis-
sible exercise of authority in relation
to the Fly by viewing it as an activity
that substantially affected interstate
commerce."' The Court noted that
an activity can affect commerce
even if it is noncommercial in
nature."' The Court studied the
legislative history of the ESA
provision in order to determine if it
fell within this category of regula-
tion.113
The legislative history of the ESA
"take" provision distinguished this
case from the Gun-Free School
Zones Act in Lopez, as the
Committee Reports on the ESA
revealed findings that such a
provision substantially affected in-
terstate commerce."' The legisla-
tive history in the Gun-Free School
Zones Act was silent as to any such
relationship."s The ESA's commit-
tee reports discussed the impor-
Vol. 5 4 No. 3
tance of preserving genetic diver-
sity and the potential future
commerce related to such diver-
sity."' The legislature sought to
promote the "continuing availability
of a wide variety of species to
interstate commerce."" 7
Legislative history alone, how-
ever, was not enough to justify the
statute's application."' The Court
stated that in evaluating the
constitutionality ofan act's applica-
tion a court must determine if there
was a "rational basis for Congress'
conclusion that a regulated activity
substantially affects interstate com-
merce."" 9 The Court examined two
reasons why Congress could
rationally conclude that the applica-
tion of Section 9 of the ESA
substantially affected interstate
commerce. 20 First, the provision
protected against the destruction of
biodiversity, and second, the provi-
sion controlled adverse effects of
interstate competition.' 2 '
The destruction of biodiversity
would threaten current and future
interstate commerce that relied
upon such diversity in day-to-day
business.'12  The Court noted that
521 of 1082 endangered species are
located in only one state, and the
elimination of even a few of those
species would have a traumatic
effect on interstate commerce. 23 In
terms of economics, plant and
animal species are valuable com-
modities as sources of medicine and
genes.'2 4 When a species vanishes,
its value may never have been
discovered, and its possible benefit
to the economy is lost.'2" The Court
found that destruction ofbiodiversity
was an action that substantially
affected interstate commerce and
was within Congress' power to
regulate.'16
Congress' finding that the "tak-
ing" of the Fly and other endangered
species would substantially affect
interstate commerce could also be
based on the premise that it was the
product of destructive interstate
competition.' According to the
Court, Congress had the power to
regulate interstate competition that
would threaten endangered species,
such as the Fly.'28 The Court based
its conclusion on three Supreme
Court cases that dealt with
destructive interstate competition in
the areas of the environment, labor
relations, and agriculture.'29  The
ESA provision at issue regulated the
"taking" of the endangered species
"1 NationalAss'n ofHome Builders, 130 F.3d at 1051.
I" d. at 1050. The committee reports noted the incalculable importance such diverse species could have to futurediscoveries in the fields ofscience, medicine, and agriculture. For example, a species on the verge ofextinction could hold thepossibility ofa cure for cancer. S.REP. NO.91-526, at 3 (1969).
"1 NationalAss'n ofHome Builders, 130 F.3d at 1051.
"' Id. The Court observed, "[t]he court must defer to a congressional finding that a regulated activity affects interstate
commerce, if there is any rational basis for such a finding." Id. (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation
Ass'n. Inc., 452 U.S. 264,276 (1981)).
20 Id. at 1052.
121 Id.
122 Id. (Biodiversity is defined as "the presence of a large number of species of animals and plants.")
123 Id.
124 Id. The Court stated that fifty percent of the most prescribed medicines are derived from wild plant and animal species.
Id In 1983, the value of these medicines alone was approximately fifteen billion dollars a year. Genetic material from wildplants and animals is also inbred into domestic animals and crops to improve productivity and value. Id. Beyond these
values, the species may be important as a tourist attraction, a scientific study, or as an evolutionary link to the past. Id at1053.
12s Id. at 1053-54. The federal court cases that have considered such Commerce Clause challenges since Lopez have held that
the extinction of animals substantially affects interstate commerce. See United States v. Bramble, 103 F.3d 1475 (9th Cir.1996); United States v. Lundquist, 932 F. Supp. 1237 (D. Or. 1996); United Statesv. Romano, 929 F. Supp. 502 (D. Mass. 1996).
'
2 NationalAss'n ofHome Builders, 130 F.3d at 1054.
127 Id.
' Id. at 1055.
I" Id. at 1055-57. Hodel v. Virginia, 452 U.S. 264 (1981), considered the constitutionality ofthe Surface Mining Control andReclamation Act of 1977. The Court held that "the power conferred by the Commerce Clause [is] broad enough to permit
congressional regulation ofactivities causing air or water pollution, or other environmental hazards that may have effects in
more than one State." Hodel v. Virginia, 452 U.S. at 282. Similar rationales were set forthin United States v. Darby, 312 U.S.100 (1941) (upheld wage and hour regulations for Georgia employees working in intrastate lumber production in order toprotect against substandard working conditions) and in Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314 (1981) (held that "prime farmland"
provisions of the Surface Mining Act did not violate constitutional powers, as they ensured that coal would not be produced
at the expense of public safety, agriculture, or the environment).
' NationalAss'n ofHome Builders, 130 F. 3d at 1056.
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in the process of building a hospital,
power plant, and an intersection that
would probably serve a variety of
individuals in more than just the state
of California.3 0 Congress passed
the statute "in part to prevent states
from gaining a competitive advan-
tage by enacting lower regulatory
standards than other states."'3 ' The
Court concluded that the ESA
substantially affected interstate
commerce by preventing destruc-
tive interstate competition, as it
required uniform regulation in all
states to protect threatened spe-
cies.132
After reviewing case law and
legislative history, the Court of
Appeals for the District ofColumbia
concluded that Congress had the
constitutional authority under the
Commerce Clause to apply the ESA
"take" provision to the Delhi Sands
Flower-Loving Fly.' The Court
affirmed the district court's ruling
upholding the government's motion
for summary judgment.' The
Court held that Congress had both
the power to regulate the channels
of interstate commerce and the
ability to determine if the "taking" of
the Fly substantially affected
interstate commerce, as it could lead
to the destruction of biodiversity and
create unfair interstate competi-
tion.'
B. Henderson's Concurrence
While concurring in the result
reached by the Court, Judge
Henderson disagreed with the
Court's conclusion that protecting
an endangered species had a
substantial effect on interstate
commerce by virtue of its potential
medical or economical value.' "
Henderson concluded that any
possible value was too uncertain to
factor into a decision to uphold
congressional power.' She also
dismissed the contention that the
application of §9 of the ESA was a
regulation over the use of interstate
commerce channels.
Judge Henderson instead upheld
the application on grounds that the
loss of biodiversity itself has a
substantial effect on the ecosystem
and as a result, interstate com-
merce. 38  She rationalized that
everything in the environment was
interconnected and the loss of one
species, even an intrastate one,
would substantially affect interstate
commerce.'39  This alone was
enough to validate Congress'
Commerce Clause authority as the
construction of a hospital, which
played a vital role in interstate
commerce, would result in endan-
gering both the Fly and its habitat.140
C. Sentelle's Dissent
Judge Sentelle's dissent focused
on the notion that Congress does not
have the power under the Com-
merce Clause to regulate the
application of §9 of the ESA to the
Fly, as such an application involves
neither commerce nor interstate
activity.' ' The dissent contended
that the Commerce Clause should
not be a catchall provision.142
Sentelle argued that the clause must
have a specific meaning, and the
application of §9 to the Fly did not
fall within any possible meaning.143
The dissent rejected the Court's
conclusion that the application was
one that regulated the use of
channels of interstate commerce.'44
Sentelle agreed with the concur-
rence that the Fly was an intrastate
creature and was not connected to
movement outside of the state.14 5
The dissent also contended that
"[t]he fact that activities like the






336 Id. at 1058.
1' Id.
3 Id. at 1059.
'9 Id. "The interstate effect of a taking is particularly obvious here given the nature of the taking the County proposes. In
enacting the ESA, Congress expressed an intent to protect not only endangered species but also the habitats that they, and
we, occupy." Id.
140 Id
"' Id. at 1060-67.
342 Id. at 1061. According to Sentelle, the Court limited such wide application in Lopez, as it provided for three categories of
regulation. See supra notes 87-95 and accompanying text.
"4 NationalAss'n ofHone Builders, 130 F.3d at 1061.
" Id at 1063.
" Id
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construction of a hospital might
involve articles that have traveled
across state lines cannot justify
federal regulation of the incidental
local effects of every local activity
in which those articles are to be
employed." 46
In the dissent, Sentelle disagreed
with both the concurrence and the
court's opinion that the application
of §9 could be a valid exercise of
congressional power, as it substan-
tially affected interstate com-
merce."' The dissent dismissed
both the biodiversity and ecosystem
arguments for upholding the appli-
cation of the statute.148
First, the dissent determined that
the ESA regulation did not control a
commercial activity.149  "Neither
killing flies nor controlling weeds
nor digging holes is either inherently
or fundamentally commercial in any
sense." 50
Second, Sentelle stated that
nothing in §9 of the ESA required
that the regulated activity affect
interstate commerce. Thus, it fell
outside of the powers granted by the
Commerce Clause.' 5'
Third, the dissent found that the
meaning given to the Commerce
Clause in the opinion and in the
concurrence provided no identifi-
able boundaries for Congress. This
gave the legislature unlimited power
to regulate purely intrastate activity
by simply stating that the activity
may in some remote way affect
interstate commerce.'52
The dissent concluded that the
attempt to regulate the taking of the
Fly must fail, as there is absolutely
no interstate commerce involved in
the application of §9 of the ESA to
the Fly.' There must be a stopping
point in order for the words of the
Constitution to have meaning.s 4
V. COMMENT
In National Ass' of Home
Builders, the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia concluded
that Congress had the constitutional
authority under the Commerce
Clause to apply the ESA's "take"
provision to the Fly.'55 The Court's
substantial-relation-to-interstate-
commerce test was probably the
most poignant line of reasoning for
upholding the application, as it
examined both the legislative
history of the ESA and prior
Commerce Clause case law.
Those who criticize expanding
the definition of interstate com-
merce often take the position
argued by Judge Sentelle in dissent
in National Ass' of Home
Builders.'" They contend that
interstate commerce cannot be a
catchall provision, as it would
render the provision in the Constitu-
tion meaningless.s' Interstate
commerce must be clearly defined
in order to avoid interfering with the
powers of the states to regulate
purely intrastate commerce.'
The Commerce Clause gives no
guidance in determining whether or
not an activity should be defined as
interstate commerce. The clause
itself simply states Congress has the
power "to regulate commerce with
foreign nations, and among the
several states, and with Indian
tribes."' 9 This has left courts with
146 Id.
1' Id.
14 Id at 1063-67.
'49 Id. at 1064.
Iso Id.





"' Id. at 1057.
'56 Id. at 1060-67. "The proposition that the federal government can, under the Interstate Commerce Clause, regulate an
activity which is neither interstate nor commerce, reminds me of the old chestnut: Ifwe had some ham, we could fix some ham
and eggs, if we had some eggs." Id. at 1061. Other critics have also argued that the Commerce Clause has lost all meaning
due to the expansive definition given to it by courts. For example, Judge Kozinski in his Introduction to Volume 19, 19 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL. 1,5 (1995), argued that the clause should probably be called the "hey-you-can-do-whatever-you-feel-like-
clause."
" National Ass'n of Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1061. Sentelle's dissent likened NationalAss'n of Home Builders to
Wickardv. Filburn, 317 U.S. 11 (1942), a Supreme Court case upholding congressional power to regulate the consumption of
home-grown wheat. Id. Sentelle contended the courts have construed the Commerce Clause too liberally to give any
recognizable meaning to the word interstate or commerce. Id.
'8 Id. at 1060. Sentelle questions in his dissent, "What business, one might ask, does the federal government have
disrupting these activities of the unit of local government, which range from the purely local to the generally local in nature?"
Id.
'19 U.S. CONST., art. 1, §8, cl. 3.
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the challenging task of trying to
determine whether Congress has
the power to regulate certain
activities. 16
In determining whether the
ESA's application to the Fly is
within Congress' Commerce Clause
power, one should look to the
congressional intent behind the
ESA "take" provision and the
purpose that the provision serves in
protecting the Fly. Through an
examination of these aspects, the
dissent's argument, as well as those
of other critics, can be rebutted.
While in some instances the
Commerce Clause has been ex-
tended too far into completely
intrastate activities, the ESA's
application to the Fly, an endan-
gered species, is not one of those
cases.
Through the legislative findings of
the ESA, the substantial relation the
"take" provision has to interstate
commerce becomes clear. These
findings discuss the importance of
genetic diversity and the potential
future commerce related to such
diversity. The Senate Report
states, "[f]rom a pragmatic point of
view, the protection of an endan-
gered species of wildlife with some
commercial value may permit the
regeneration of that species to a
level where controlled exploitation
of that species can be resumed."''
The Report, more importantly,
emphasizes the importance of the
gene pool and its preservation, as
the gene material might be invalu-
able for future discoveries in
numerous fields, such as medicine
or agriculture.162  Similarly, the
House Report emphasized the
importance of endangered species
by noting that they are potential keys
to a variety of puzzles that cannot
yet be solved, such as cancer.'16
What is quite disturbing about the
dissent in National Ass'n of Home
Builders is the fact that Sentelle
quickly dismissed these argu-
ments.'" He argued that:
because of some undeter-
mined and indeed indetermin-
able possibility that the fly
might produce something at
some undefined and undeter-
mined future time which
might have some indetermin-
able medical value, which in
turn might affect interstate
commerce at that imagined
future point, Congress can
today regulate anything which
might advance the pace at
which the endangered spe-
cies becomes extinct.165
What the dissent fails to compre-
hend, unlike the majority, is that
what is being considered is not only
the extinction ofa single species, but
the aggregate effect on commerce
through the loss of biodiversity.'"
The impact on interstate commerce
as a result ofthe extinction ofthe Fly
may be hard to predict, but this is not
the point. The premise is that the
loss of endangered species, as a
whole, has a substantial effect on
interstate commerce.' 6'
The effect of endangered species
on interstate commerce was recog-
nized in a post-Lopez case, United
States v. Bramble,'" where the
Ninth Circuit held that the Eagle
Protection Act was a valid exercise
of Congress' Commerce Clause
power.16 9 The Court reasoned that
the extinction of the eagle would
substantially affect interstate com-
merce by "foreclosing any possibil-
ity of several types of commercial
activity."' '. Prior to Lopez, courts
also consistently concluded that
Congress' efforts to protect endan-
gered species were constitutional
under the Commerce Clause."'
1e A court must be deferential to congressional findings regarding interstate commerce, upholding a regulation if there is any
rational basis. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n., Inc., 452 U. S. 264, 276 (1981).
" See S. REP. NO. 91-526, at 3 (1969).
362 S. REP. NO. 91-526, at 5 (1969). "[A]s a species is lost, its distinctive gene material, which may subsequently prove
invaluable to mankind. . .is also irretrievably lost." Id.
363 H.R. REP. NO. 93-412, at 4-5 (1973). "As we homogenize the habitats in which these plants and animals evolved, and as
we increase the pressure for products that they are in a position to supply (usually unwillingly) we threaten their- -and our
own- -genetic heritage." Id.
'" NationalAss'n offlome Builders, 130 F.3d at 1060-67.
'
6 Id. at 1064.
'" Id. at 1054.
167 Id.
' 103 F.3d 1475 (9th Cir. 1996).
169 Id.
"o Id. at 1481. See also United States v. Lundquist, 932 F. Supp. 1237, 1245 (D.Or. 1996), which held that "the possession of
eagle parts is an activity which affects a broad regulatory scheme relating to commercial transactions and which, when
viewed in the aggregate with similar activities nationwide, substantially affects interstate commerce."
"' See Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896F.2d 354,360 (9th Cir. 1990), which stated that"[t]he commerce clausepower...is
broad enough to extend [federal] jurisdiction to local waters which may provide habitat to birds and endangered species."
See also Andrusv. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979) (noting Commerce Clause power reaches migratory wildlife).
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The purpose of the ESA's "take"
provision is to protect endangered
species from extinction.172 Differ-
ent varieties of endangered fish,
wildlife, and plants may, to some,
seem not worth protecting, but the
aim of the Act was to protect all
endangered species from being
destroyed. As such, Congress
intended to ensure that the benefits
endangered species provided or
could provide would be available to
all citizens.17 4 In its Declaration of
Policy for the ESA, both the Senate
and the House stated that the
purpose of the Act was to safeguard
the nation's endangered species.'"
If California destroys the Fly or its
habitat, the destruction affects the
citizens of the United States as a
whole.'76  Congress, through the
ESA, must be able to regulate the
"taking" of endangered species in
order to protect everyone's rights.
Through such regulation, Congress
prevents destructive interstate com-
petition, which has a substantial
relation to interstate commerce.' 7
The ESA "take" provision, which
affects society and its commerce
power in all fifty states, needs to be
uniformly regulated.
Taken to the extreme, the
dissent's position in National Ass 'n
ofHome Builders could lead to the
destruction of numerous endan-
gered species. Could the habitat of
the endangered California condor
be destroyed to build an office
complex? Could a state construct a
highway through the home of the
endangered woodland caribou?
Many people would be outraged at
such thoughts; however, this is
exactly what California had planned
for the Fly. If the congressional
regulation was declared invalid, the
Fly would have been left unpro-
tected and likely driven to extinc-
tion. The application of the ESA
"take" provision to the Fly protects
the endangered species, one of
many species vital to biodiversity
and consequently, interstate com-
merce. Congress must have such
power through the Commerce
Clause to safeguard endangered
wildlife.
VI. CONCLUSION
The decision in National Asso-
ciation of Home Builders v.
Babbitt will be extremely important
in the coming years as the human
population grows and urban devel-
opment encroaches further and
further upon lands that were
previously inhabited only by wildlife
and plant species. Congress' ability
under the Commerce Clause to
apply the ESA "take" provision to
endangered and threatened ani-
mals, such as the Fly, will be crucial
in preserving uniform federal
regulation of such species, thereby
protecting biodiversity and their
future, as well as our own.
172 119 CO14G. REC. 30, 157 (1973). The Senate's Declaration ofPolicy states: "various species offish, wildlife, and plants in
the United States have been rendered extinct as a consequence of economic growth and development untempered by
adequate concern and conservation." Id.
1" Judge Sentelle in his dissent in National Ass'n of Home Builders takes an almost sarcastic tone in examining the
application of the ESA to the Fly. He states:
the statute forbidding the taking of endagnered species can be used, provided it passes constitutional
muster, to prevent counties and their citizens from building hospitals or from driving to those hospitals
by routes in which the bugs smashed upon their windshields might turn out to include the Dehli Sands
Flower-Loving Fly. NationalAss 'n ofHome Builders, 130 F.3d. at 1061.
In examining the dissent, it seems that the Fly is viewed as a major barrier to progress, in that the County needs the hospital
and a Fly is impeding progress. Id. at 1060. This progress-stops-at-nothing attitude seems to pervade Sentelle's whole
argument. Although the Fly may seem worthless to some individuals, some of the most important products in commerce
have been produced from animals and plants, which were at one time seemingly worthless. For example, mold, which led
to the discovery of antibiotics, was once only valued for the flavoring it provided to cheese. See id. at 1054.
74 119 CONG. REC. 25, 694 (1973). The House's Declaration ofFindings, Purpose, and Policy stated:
[t]he Congress finds and declares that one of the unfortunate consequences of growth and
development in the United States and elsewhere has been the extermination of some species or
subspecies of fish, wildlife, and plants; that serious losses in species of wild animals with
educational, historical, recreational, and scientific value have occurred and are occurring...; that a
key to more effective protection and management of native fish and wildlife that are endangered or
threatened is to encourage and assist the States in developing programs for such fish and wildlife;
and that the conservation, protection, restoration, or propagation of such species will inure to the
benefit ofall citizens. Id.175 Id.
76 NationalAss'n ofHome Builders, 130 F.3d at 1054.
" Id. at 1054-57. Destructive interstate competition includes the destruction of the availability of a
variety of species through the acts of a single state, as the effect will likely be felt in more than one state.
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